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Foreign Policy Articles Escape Is Not An Option
December 7, 2001; 22 Kislev 5762; No. 2144 By It is rare for nations to learn from their mistakes. When they do, it can be an ennobling experience, a hopeful sign that perhaps history and experience, after all, have some important lessons to teach. And so it was on November 19 when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld held his regular press briefing. During one exchange with correspondents, Rumsfeld was asked to comment on reports that Taliban troops and al-Qaida terrorists holed up in the northern Afghan city of Kunduz had offered to surrender to northern alliance forces. As a condition of their surrender they asked for safe passage to a third country. Rumsfeld responded, “The idea of their getting out of the country and going off to make their mischief somewhere else is not a happy prospect… Any idea that those people…should end up in some type of negotiation that would allow them to leave the country and go off and destabilize other countries and engage in terrorist attacks on the United States is something I would certainly do everything I could to prevent.” Bravo. Finally, it appears, the US has learned a lesson lost on so many earlier generations of diplomats. Showing mercy to a terrorist enemy, bruised but not beaten, is a sure guarantee he will be back, only next time with a vengeance. Saddam Hussein proved this point when he was allowed to escape his final judgment at the Gulf War’s end. It still haunts members of the current administration who participated in the decision a decade ago. Despite 10 years of international sanctions, UN inspections and intermittent air strikes, Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction continue to threaten world security. A similar naivete existed in Washington in 1982 when the Israeli Army, commanded by then-general Ariel Sharon, laid siege to a force of 6,000-9,000 Palestinian fighters bottled up in Beirut. The Reagan Administration was eager for a quick end to the conflict, fearful it might destabilize the region and alienate friendly Arab regimes. Washington’s solution: demand Israel allow Yasser Arafat and his PLO to evacuate the city and be transported, at American expense, to Tunis. Once there, Washington hoped the terrorists would take early retirement, lose interest in attacking Israel, and blend peacefully into society. It was an unwise gamble. Instead of fading away, the PLO consolidated its hold on power, regrouped, rearmed and prepared for the next round of its struggle against the Jewish State. Much of the violence no gripping Israel and the territories can be traced to the reintroduction of PLO fighters from Tunis into the administrative and security apparatus of the Palestinian Authority. At the time, Israel argued strenuously it be allowed to finish a job that already had cost hundreds of casualties. Yet Washington was adamant: peace could never be achieved if the Palestinian leadership was humiliated. Instead, Israel was humiliated, with the result being 20 years of non-stop terrorism and guerilla war. The same refrain was heard in 1973, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ordered Jerusalem not to destroy Egypt’s Third and Fifth Armies during the final days of the Yom Kippur War. Surrounded and battered after inflicting heavy losses on Israeli forces, the Egyptian attackers were on the verge of annihilation. Last minute American pressure spared Egypt’s army and its honor complete destruction. Though a peace treaty eventually was signed between Israel and Egypt, it has been a cold peace. Cairo has used the interregnum to rebuild and modernize its armed forces in likely preparation for another war with Israel. As Rumsfeld contemplates what to do with the Taliban and al-Qaida fighters now being routed from their strongholds in Afghanistan, he should recall the British experience there. The year was 1842. After three years of fighting, an uprising in Afghanistan rove a British and Indian garrison of 4,500 troops and 12,000 civilians to abandon the country. As they fled, they were pursued and harassed by warring tribesmen eager for revenge. The retreating caravan left Kabul on January 6, 1842. On January 13, a single, exhausted European, Dr. William Brydon, arrived at the gates of Jalalabad. He was all that remained of Britain’s Army in Afghanistan. No mercy was shown to those in retreat. No prisoners were taken. The Middle East is a harsh and unforgiving place, well accustomed to total war and the total defeat of an enemy. It is a tradition that has set the tone for the current wave of terrorism and, by its own definition, leaves no room for compromise. Faced with such an adversary, the US – and Israel – have little choice, but to engage all of their resources in a fight to the finish. Guerilla war must be met with guerilla tactics. Acts of unconscionable brutality must be repaid in an equally harsh coin. For when it comes to fighting terrorism, mercy is a luxury that even the victorious can ill-afford. The writer, a Maryland-based
public policy consultant, is a former staff member of the US Senate Defense
Appropriations and Foreign Operations Appropriations subcommittees. |
