|
|
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
Foreign Policy Articles Should the White House demand more of its coalition partners against terrorism?
Symposium Issue Date: By Rand H. Fishbein
As things now stand, many of the states assisting the U.S.-led war on the Taliban have given only qualified support. For some, the contribution has been merely rhetorical, while others have demanded a quid pro quo for their services. Two countries in particular, Syria and Iran, remain among the world's chief sponsors of terrorism and are anything but desirable partners. No doubt this situation is causing much anxiety in the White House, which has staked its reputation, and that of Operation Enduring Freedom, on two unambiguous moral principles: First, terrorism is the enemy of peace and democracy and, second, countries which aid or abet terrorists are on the wrong side of the law and must be punished. President George W. Bush was right to lay down this challenge to the world community in his speech to Congress on Sept. 20. But, he should be under no illusions. A number of the countries he has openly embraced have no real interest in ending a practice that has served them well over the years. Others stand implacably opposed to U.S. interests in the Middle East. They continue to provide training, logistics, financing, intelligence, safe haven, inspiration and manpower to Islamic extremists and psychopathic killers the world over. So what is the Bush administration to do? The answer, it seems, may well lie in another enduring American principle: accountability. Countries that have pledged their support for the U.S. cause first must demonstrate that they are committed to fighting the terrorist menace before they can lay claim to American largess. And the support must be clear and convincing. As John F. Kennedy astutely observed, "Lofty words cannot construct an alliance or maintain it; only concrete deeds can do that." This means that America's partners must be held to a measurable standard of conduct — conduct that should involve both the provision of material assistance to U.S. forces fighting terrorism and the adoption of specific government policies targeted at the eradication of their domestic terrorist infrastructures. Only after these actions are publicly and independently verified should U.S. aid be forthcoming. Turkey, Uzbekistan and Jordan — though plagued by their own radical Muslim insurgencies — have summoned the courage to aid the United States while other countries, in particular Egypt and Indonesia, have been guarded in their support. Both governments have urged restraint from Washington while offering little in the way of practical assistance. Pakistan is perhaps in the most difficult position. Though its president, Pervez Musharraf, publicly has endorsed the U.S.-led campaign and granted the U.S. military overflight rights, reports indicate that the country's secret intelligence directorate continues to aid the Taliban. The directorate, along with Pakistan's military, largely was responsible for the Taliban's rise to power in 1996. In an approach that might well be called the "Bush Doctrine," the president has leveled five demands on the Taliban leadership. Three of these should be extended beyond the Afghan regime to other nations seeking membership in the antiterror coalition. They include: "Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of (international terrorist groups) who hide in your land." "Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp" in your country, "and hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities." "Give the United
States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they
are no longer operating." President Bush left no room for ambiguity in his statement to Congress. In words aimed directly at the Afghan regime, but meant for a wider audience, he declared: "These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion." It was a rare moment in U.S. history, one that surely would have made the likes of Eliot Ness and legions of Texas Rangers proud. The president's remarks represent an important turning point in U.S. foreign policy. For the first time since the 1986 bombing of Libya, Washington is unwilling to treat terrorism as a matter best handled through the criminal-justice system and the FBI. The enormity of the Sept. 11 attack and the extensive nature of the threat have pushed counterterrorism to the forefront of our national agenda. The administration has signaled its intention to see this fight through to the end, assuming a moral stance from which there can be no equivocation, no compromise and no retreat. Yet, if the United States is to succeed, then the countries with which it is allied must recognize their responsibilities and stand fully accountable for their actions. Nothing less than their security, and U.S. credibility, is at stake. This particularly is true for those regimes that continue to associate themselves with criminal organizations, religious zealots or national-liberation groups that use terrorism in their campaigns for recognition. This is what makes the Bush administration's overtures to Syria and Iran so disturbing. Both countries are on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. Each trains and supplies a myriad of terrorist groups committed to the elimination of Western influence from the Middle East. For nearly two decades, surrogate groups such as Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad have used bases in Lebanon to wage an unrelenting war against U.S. and Israeli interests around the world. Lebanon's Bekaa Valley serves as a sanctuary where they oversee the growth, processing and distribution of high-grade narcotics to Europe and America. U.S. investigators believe that both Tehran and Damascus have been involved, at least since 1990, in the large-scale counterfeiting of Western currency, particularly American dollars. Funds laundered through their drug-trafficking operations are used to support terrorist groups operating under their control. Both Syria and Iran continue to undermine U.S. efforts towards a regional Middle East peace. Syria has armed, trained and harbored elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization. For years its intelligence service has assisted in attacks against American targets in Europe and the Middle East. Until the rise of Osama bin Laden, Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyeh was the terrorist most wanted by the FBI. Mughniyeh operates out of Lebanon under the full protection of Syria. Intelligence officials believe he was behind the hostage crisis in Lebanon in the 1980s, the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and U.S. Embassy in that country and the murder of CIA station chief William Buckley. Iran, for its part, is thought to have engineered the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in 1994, together killing more than 120 people. It is unclear what the United States hopes to gain by having rogue states such as Syria and Iran in an antiterrorist coalition. Unlike Turkey, Uzbekistan and even Russia, they have contributed nothing of substance to the cause and are unlikely to do so. The Bush administration should reconsider any plans it may be developing to transfer weapons to these two countries or to strike them from the government's list of terrorist states in return for their alleged support. For Saudi Arabia, a lukewarm participant in the antiterror coalition, partnership should involve a more vigorous spirit of cooperation. While it is true that recent events have shaken the stability of the country, it also is the case that the government's failure to eradicate the sources of terrorist support within the kingdom could lead to its own collapse. Reports that Saudi charities have served as a conduit for funds going to bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization should prompt Washington and Riyadh to come to a new understanding of the need for tighter Saudi security over the radical political activities of its citizens and the nation's banking transactions. At the same time, the FBI should be allowed to interrogate Saudi subjects, pursue domestic-intelligence leads and collect evidence in criminal cases previously denied by the government. Lastly, the United States should be granted the right to fly combat missions from Saudi territory. Holding nations accountable for their actions in this war is the only way we can begin to control the threat. Demanding less of countries simply because it may be politically comfortable only will prolong the fight and cast doubt on its ultimate success. This is not a risk-free conflict. The United States is right to expect all those it helps to bear some of the burden. During the Persian Gulf War the United States collected about $65 billion from its allies to pay for the war. Today it is Washington that is footing the bill. Bush has begun his war on terrorism by assembling an international coalition to fight the forces of lawlessness and barbarism emanating from the Middle East. It was a clever if not ennobling idea, audacious in scope and quintessentially American. The president was right to make this his opening move. However, he should not be disappointed if many of his newfound partners turn out to be less cooperative than he had hoped. After all, this is the Middle East, where cynicism and deceit often conspire against even the most modest of expectations. And so it was in the 1950s when the United States tried to build a pan-Islamic, anticommunist coalition across the Middle East. Ultimately, plans for a Baghdad Pact foundered, as each of the parties — Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Britain and the United States — realized that they shared different visions for the region. To the Arabs, issues of decolonization, nationalism and the allure of the emerging nonaligned movement were of paramount importance. To Washington, the issue was keeping the Soviet Union at bay. Today, the issue dominating the headlines is terrorism. Yet it is America's issue, not one that by itself motivates the people of the Middle East to action. The American people should understand that while we fear Islamic radicalism and the terrorist menace it spawns, this phenomenon has been a feature of Middle Eastern life for centuries and is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. As the last remaining
superpower, the United States has a right to expect more of its coalition
partners. If for nothing more than pragmatic reasons, the governments
of the region should see it in their interest to assist an ally upon whose
security structure, technical expertise and markets they rely. While the
terrorist scourge may loom as an existential concern for the United States,
for many in the Middle East, it is simply bad business.
|
