Foreign Policy Articles

WHICH WAY BUSH MIDDLE EAST POLICY?

Rand H. Fishbein, Ph.D.
The Washington Jewish Week

August 23, 2001

Something is amiss in U.S.-Israel relations. Its origins appear to stretch
back to Oct. 12, 2000, and the terrorist bombing of the U.S.S. Cole as it
sat anchored in Aden harbor. From that day to the present, no vessel of the
U.S. Sixth Fleet reportedly has made a port visit to Haifa, the U.S. Navy¹s
principal repair and resupply station in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Joint training exercises between the armed forces of Israel and the United
States, a promised supplemental Israeli aid package and plans to expand
industrial ties are all on hold.

Given the high stakes involved, many observers have begun to wonder whether
the Bush Administration has lost its way or whether it is sending a
not-so-subtle message that American Middle East policy is changing.

In either case, cracks are showing in the once impenetrable strategic
partnership between the United States and Israel, cracks that are at odds
with the seemingly strong, pro-Israel credentials of the president and some
of his closest advisers.

Meanwhile, the National Security Council and the State Department remain
filled with Clinton appointees unalterably opposed to the new administration
and its reluctance to embrace the Oslo process. Their historic antipathy
toward Israel has been given a new raison d'être by the collapse of Oslo,
the failure of the "new Middle East" to take shape and the election of the
Sharon government.

Amazingly, many hold Israel responsible for not rescuing the Palestinian
leadership from its failure at Camp David and not delivering even more
life-threatening concessions in the name of peace.

In their public statements and policy pronouncements, the department's
spokesmen have been relentless in their efforts to chip away at the close
relationship between the U.S. and Israel. This seems to have undermined the
best intentions of the Bush White House.

In just the last six months, Secretary of State Colin Powell and his
advisers have condemned nearly every Israeli response to terrorism as
excessive, indiscriminate or unjustified, regardless of the force used.
Even Israel's seizure of Palestinian offices in Jerusalem on Aug. 10
produced a sharp rebuke by department spokesman Richard Boucher.
Never mind that Israel¹s action came in response to a Hamas suicide bombing
that claimed the lives of 15 civilians, including six children, five members
of a single family and one American tourist.

Even more troubling is the State Department's steadfast refusal to include
Arafat's terrorist militia, the Tanzim, on its list of terrorist
organizations.

Topping the list of strategic concerns are reports out of the Middle East
that highly trained units of the Iraqi Army crossed over into Jordan in late
July. Their goal was to infiltrate Israel and lend support to the
Palestinian uprising. The Iraqi movements were first spotted by Israeli
satellites and photo-reconnaissance aircraft and then promptly communicated
to a nervous Jordanian government.

Confronted with this seemingly dire intelligence, U.S. officials reportedly
told the Israelis not to take any overt actions that might upset U.S. plans
for Iraq.

Yet, if the U.S. is secretly hoping that Saddam Hussein will provoke a
confrontation sufficient to justify a massive retaliatory strike, then the
U.S. should be increasing, not decreasing, its visibility in the Middle
East.

For the U.S. to distance itself from Israel at this critical juncture is a
high-risk gamble that could easily backfire. Sensing weakness in the
U.S.-Israel relationship and a lack of resolve in defending its interests,
America¹s foes in the region might seize the moment to plunge the region
into full-scale war. Presumably, Saddam has learned from his mistakes in
1990-91 and will not hesitate to use all of the armaments at his disposal,
including weapons of mass destruction.

No matter how much the Bush administration may wish to disengage from the
tedious and expensive role carved out in the Middle East by its
predecessors, it would do well to proceed with caution. Like it or not, the
U.S. military has become an indispensable force for stability in the region.
A retreat only invites the intervention of countries like Russia, China,
Iraq and Iran, all of which are anxious to supplant American influence in
the Middle East.

As with community policing on the streets of America's cities, the forward
presence of the U.S. "cop on the beat"serves as a powerful deterrent. For
nearly five decades this has been a mantra of America's Navy chiefs in
justifying their annual spending request to Congress. Protecting the sea
lanes and "showing the flag," they argue correctly, are the Navy¹s two most
important roles.

The president has often said that he believes that a strong U.S.-Israel
relationship is in the best interest of regional peace. Symbolic of this was
his pledge during the campaign that he would move the U.S. Embassy to
Jerusalem once he assumed office. These statements make recent U.S. actions
seem all the more incongruous.

The first sign of a problem arose in April of this year when Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, in a cost-cutting move, suggested that the U.S. withdraw
some of its troops assigned to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
peacekeeping unit patrolling the Sinai Peninsula. The MFO has patrolled the
Sinai since 1982, when Israel completed its withdrawal from the Peninsula,
serving as the backbone of the Israeli-Egyptian peace, a trip wire against
aggressive steps by either party.

However, for years now, Egypt has tolerated large-scale weapons smuggling
from Egyptian controlled Sinai into Palestinian-held territory in
neighboring Gaza. Vast quantities of small arms, ammunition, and reportedly,
shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, smuggled through tunnels dug under
the international border, have helped to fuel the current Palestinian war
against Israel.

Cairo has done nothing to stop this activity. Instead of withdrawing
American troops from Sinai, the president should beef up their presence,
update detection equipment and publicly chastise the Egyptian government for
undermining peace with Israel.

Caught between his "get tough" instinct and cautionary warnings from the
State Department, President Bush must now decide whether he will stand with
a trusted ally, Israel, or bow to Palestinian intimidation. To retreat from
the Middle East will be seen by America's foes as a sign both of profound
weakness and of shame. This could spark, not discourage, a new round of
terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and perhaps even regional war.

Throughout Israel's turbulent history, the U.S. has maintained a high
profile relationship with its closest Middle East ally, readily
acknowledging the strong political ties, shared values, and strategic
alliance that bind the destiny of the two nations together.

Yet, as war looms in the Middle East, the U.S. has chosen hesitancy over
resolve, signaling to friend and foe alike that, perhaps, it is no longer
prepared to accept the risks of superpower status.


Rand Fishbein, Ph.D., is president of Fishbein Associates, Inc., a public-policy consulting firm based in Potomac. He is a former staff member of both the U.S. Senate Defense Appropriations and Foreign Operations
Appropriations subcommittees. Dr. Fishbein also served as special assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI).

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